魏晋风度: 时代周刊：为什么我们害怕一个崛起的中国

译者 yehui945

It's hard to argue that the rise of China, taken on the whole, is anything but good for the global economy. New wealth for China's 1.3 billion people means 1.3 billion more people who can buy stuff from the rest of the world,creating jobsfrom American research labs to Japanese industrial zones to Brazilian mines. A global economy no longer solely dependent on the U.S. consumer for growth is potentially more stable and prosperous.

总体上来说，中国的崛起对全球经济推动作用是毋庸置疑的。13亿的中国人拥有的新财富意味着有 13 亿甚至更多的人可以从世界各地购买产品。从美国研究实验室到日本的工业区，再到巴西的采矿业，中国正为世界创造着无数的就业机会。如今全球经济在不依赖美国人消费的情况下，也有可能获得更加稳定和繁荣的增长。

Yet few people see China that way. Many don't acknowledge China's positive role in the world economy at all. Instead, they focus on the competition China has created, especially for the developed world, or the jobs many believe China has "stolen." However, even those who realize, or even directly benefit from, China's advance still can't but feel uneasy about that advance. But why is that? Why do we fear a rising China in a way we don't a rising India? Or why is an economically powerful China less acceptable than, for example, a stronger Europe?

然而很少有人以这种方式看待中国。很多人根本不承认中国在世界经济中所起的积极作用。相反，他们更关注于中国给世界带来的竞争，尤其是在发达国家，很多人认为中国"偷走"了他们的就业机会。但是，即便是那些认识到这一点，甚至是直接从中国发展中受益的人也依旧对中国的进步感到很不安。这是为什么呢？为什么我们不是害怕一个日益崛起的印度，而是去害怕一个崛起的中国？为什么我们可以接受一个经济上更加强大的欧洲，却不能接受一个经济较欧洲稍弱的中国呢？

The conflicting emotions many have about China's rise are the subject of my latestTIME magazine story, focused on Australia's relationship with the Middle Kingdom. What's happening Down Under is a glimpse into the future for all of us. And for me, reporting there got me thinking about why so many of us – and not just in the West, but out here in Asia as well – are having so much trouble coming to terms with the idea of China as a superpower.

很多人对中国崛起都持着一种矛盾的情感，这正是我最新一期的时代杂志故事的主题，这本杂志侧重于描述澳大利亚与这个中央集权国家的关系。在澳大利亚发生的事就是我们对未来的一种预见。对我来说，在那里的报道让我开始思考，为什么我们— — 不仅仅包括西方人，很多亚洲人也是如此— —就这么难对中国作为超级大国这一想法达成共识。

There are few countries in the world that have benefited more from China's rapid economic growth than Australia. The boom in exports Australia has enjoyed due to surging Chinese demand, especially for raw materials, is a key reason –perhaps the determining factor– why the country avoided a recession after the 2008 financial crisis. Trade with China is also spurring investment and creating jobs. But simultaneously, Australians are becoming uncomfortable about their growing relationship with China. They fret that the economy is becoming too dependent on China for its growth. They worry China will use its economic leverage to put political pressure on the country, or employ its growing economic power to become a strategic threat. They don't much care for Chinese companies buying Australian assets. Australians worry that what helps their wallets hurts their country politically and strategically, and the more powerful China gets, the bigger that potential danger. Hugh White, head of the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, explained the sentiment to me this way: "As China keeps growing strong enough to fulfill Australians' economic aspirations, it grows more powerful and undermines U.S. primacy and our strategic aspirations. People are conscious that with the benefits we get from Chinese growth, there is a certain degree of vulnerability."

这个世界上极少有国家能像澳大利亚那样从快速发展的中国获得如此多的利益。不断飙升的中国需求让澳大利亚的出口，特别是原材料出口，享受着长期的繁荣。这也是为什么这个国家在2008 年金融危机后的避免了经济衰退的关键原因，甚至说是决定性的原因。与中国的贸易也促进了投资，创造就业机会。但同时，澳大利亚人却对日益增进中澳关系感到不安。他们担心经济增长会过于依赖中国。他们也担心中国会利用其经济影响力对自己的国家施加政治压力或者把其日益增强的经济实力变成一种战略威胁。他们不太喜欢来澳大利亚购买资产的中国公司。澳大利亚人担心在经济上帮助了他们的中国会在政治上和战略上伤害到他们。中国越强大，潜在的危险也就越大。澳大利亚国立大学战略与防御研究中心主任休•怀特向我讲述了他的观点：发展的中国将强大到足以满足澳大利亚的经济愿望，他将变得更强大，强大到可以动摇美国的霸主地位和我们的战略愿望。人们意识当自己从中国经济增长中获益的同时，也得到了某种程度的脆弱性。

I think many of us around the world can sympathize with the Australians. As David Pilling ofThe Financial Timesrecently pointed out, China's neighbors aren't too fond of the way Beijing throws its new heft around in the Asia region as its economic influence grows. It's no coincidence that political leaders in Seoul and Taipei strive to maintain strong ties to Washington even as their economies become driven more and more by China. Americans are queasy that the Chinese own so much U.S. debt. The Japanese own just about as much, but that doesn't seem to bother anybody.

我想世界各地许多人都会和澳大利亚人有着共鸣。最近，戴维皮林的《金融时报》指出，中国的邻国不太喜欢北京利用经济杠杆向他们施加影响力。这就是为什么当韩国和台湾的经济越来越依赖于中国时，他们的政治领导人却想方设法的维持和华盛顿的牢固联系。中国拥有着巨额的美国国债，这让美国人感到很不自在。日本也持着巨额的美国国债，但这似乎并不让人感到麻烦。

Of course, 30 years ago, it might have. The reaction many have to China today is very similar to the one that towards Japan in the 1980s, when the Land of the Rising Sun was the rising economic challenger to the West. In recent years, Americans got all jittery about a Chinese attempt to buy oil firm Unocal; more than 20 years ago, Americans got all jittery over Japan's acquisition of Rockefeller Center. Why? After the overly emotional response in the U.S. to Sony's acquisition of Hollywood's Columbia Pictures, co-founder Akio Morita pointed out that Australian born Rupert Murdoch had previously bought 20thCentury Fox, without the drama. He was suggesting the reason was racism.

当然，30 年前，我们也许会感到日本是个麻烦。今天很多人对中国的反应恰似的我们上世纪 80 年代对日本的反应，当时这个日出之国正是挑战西方的崛起者。近年来，美国人总是对中国试图购买优尼科公司感到惴惴不安，20 多年前，在日本收购洛克菲勒中心时美国人也感到无比紧张。这是为什么呢？索尼创始人田昭夫指出：在索尼收购好莱坞哥伦比亚影业之前，澳大利亚出生鲁珀特 • 默多克已经买下了 20 世纪福克斯，但戏剧性的是，美国人对默多克的收购没什么动静，对索尼的收购却表现出了过激的反应。田昭夫认为这是种族主义偏见。

That may be part of the story today with China as well. But the issues are far more complex than that. In the West, Europeans and Americans have dominated the world scene for so many centuries that they're uncomfortable with the notion of someone else claiming the throne of global hegemony. The concern Americans had with Japan back in the day was that the Japanese were competitors in the global economy, not partners. The fear was that Japan was trying to undermine American dominance, at least in the realm of business. Even beyond that, Japan was winning with an economic system that challenged American ideals of free markets and free enterprise. For many, the rise of Japan seemed to have something sinister behind it – a competing and unfamiliar economic, corporate and cultural system that was producing superior results to those of the West, and appeared to have only its own interests at heart. The challenge from Japan was not just economic, but ideological.

这可能是与当今中国相关的故事的一部分。但实际的问题比那复杂得多。在西方，欧洲人和美国人长时间主宰着世界，以至于他们对有人声称要夺取全球霸权的宝座的打算感到很不舒服。那时美国和日本的关系变冷淡的原因正是因为日本人已成为其在全球经济中的竞争对手，而不是伙伴。美国人害怕日本试图破坏他的统治地位，至少是害日本破坏其在商业领域的优势。但日本确实成功的用这个经济体系挑战了美国理想的自由市场和自由企业。对于许多人来说，日本的崛起的背后似乎有什么险恶的阴谋 — —一个极具竞争力却不为人熟悉的经济体、他们的企业和文化系统比之西方更能产生卓越的业绩，并且他们似乎只关心自己的利益。可以说来自日本的挑战并不只是在经济上，也包括了意识形态领域的。

The reasons many fear China today are very similar. China, too, uses a competing economic model – "state capitalism" – that challenges the economic ideology of the West. In many ways, China also behaves in a mercantilist fashion, which gives the impression it cares little about anyone else. It keeps its currency controlled so its exports can out-compete those from other countries, and it grabs natural resources for itself wherever and whenever it can. Often state-controlled companies are doing the grabbing, making China seem like a threatening monolithic juggernaut. Worst of all, the political ideology behind China's economic ascent completely counters Western ideals about democracy and human rights. China is not just competing with the U.S. in world markets, but offering up an entirely different economic and political system, one that at times seems better at creating growth and jobs, even as it restricts much-cherished civil liberties. China is succeeding based on ideas that Americans despise.

这与今天许多人担心中国的原因是非常相似的。中国也使用同样的经济竞争模式— —"国家资本主义"— —挑战着西方的经济意识形态。在许多方面，中国同样给人以一种自私自利的重商主义的印象。他操控货币以保持出口优势，他贪婪的获取自然资源。他的国有控股的公司往往做一些吸引眼球的事，这使中国看起来像是一个极具威胁的庞大主宰。最糟糕的是，中国经济崛起背后的政治意识形态完全颠覆了西方关于民主和人权的理想。中国不只是与美国在全球市场竞争，而是给世界提供了一种完全不同的经济和政治体系，这种体系有时似乎更善于创造经济增长和就业，但它也极大限制了公民的自由权。中国所推销的理念正是美国人所蔑视的。

The concerns many in the world have with China go well beyond even that. No one ever expected Japan to become a military threat to the West, or even a contender for diplomatic influence around the world. Japan wanted to be No.1, but only when it came to its role in the world economy. Aside from that Japan was a part of the global establishment – a member of the G7 and a clear U.S. military ally. China is none of those things. More and more, China is using its economic clout to offer an alternative to the U.S.-led political and economic system. Beijing routinely complains about the primacy of the dollar and wantsits own currency to play a greater international role.Chinese diplomats have tried to extend their country's political pull across Africa and Latin America while supporting countries clearly hostile to U.S. interests (such as North Korea.) And Beijing is becoming abigger military poweras well, something that makes its neighbors, many of which have a history of conflict with China (South Korea, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan) extremely nervous. Every extra 10% to China's GDP translates into more money the government can spend on its navy and armed forces.

世界上一些关注中国的人想到的还不止这些。没有人会去想日本是否会成为西方的军事威胁者或者外交影响的竞争者。日本想做第一，但也是仅限于经济领域而已。除此之外，日本的角色就是G7的成员国，一个完完全全的美国军事盟友。而中国哪个都不属于。中国正越来越多的利用其经济影响力，向世界提供替代美国为主导的政治和经济制度。北京经常抱怨美元的主导地位，并希望自己的货币方面发挥更大的国际作用。中国外交官已尝试跨非洲和拉丁美洲扩展他们的国家政治影响力，同时支持对美国怀有明显敌视的国家，例如朝鲜。北京军事力量正变的更加强大，这使那些过去与他有过历史冲突的邻国，比如韩国，越南，日本，台湾感到极度不安。中国的GDP每增长10%，就意味着中国政府有更多的钱可以投入到海军和武装部队中。

In other words, China appears to be challenging not just today's economic orthodoxy and order, but the world's political and military framework as well. China isn't content just to sell more TV sets to the world, like Japan. The Chinese want to have more control over the world. And they want to use their economic clout to get it.

换句话说，中国似乎不只是挑战当今的正统经济模式和秩序，也挑战着世界的政治和军事框架。中国并不会像日本那样，仅满足于卖更多的电视给世界。中国想要的是更多地控制世界。他们想要利用其经济影响力来得到它。

Or so we think. The fact is we're only guessing at what China might do as a superpower. Since China is still a relatively poor nation today, it makes sense that at this stage in its development, its leadership tends to be focused on what's good for China. Will China's outlook broaden as it become richer? We don't know.

或者我们认为，事实是我们只能是猜测，当中国在成为一个超级大国时，他会做些什么？由于中国今天仍然是一个相对贫穷的国家，所以我们对他的领导层所做的一些利己的事表示理解，但富裕之后的中国呢，野心会扩大吗？我们不得而知。

When the U.S. took over global leadership from a waning British Empire, the world had a pretty good idea what to expect – that overall the U.S. would continue to hold to ideas of free enterprise and democracy. Now an equally important shift is taking place – the rise of the East – but it's not so clear what it all means for the direction of global civilization. So maybe that's what we fear most of all. The uncertainty of a fundamentally changing world.

当美国从日渐式微的英帝国接管了全球领导地位时，世界有了一个不错的预期 — —美国必将继续坚持自由企业和民主的思想。如今一个崛起的东方大国又一次主导了这种转变，但我们还不清楚的是这次转变对全球文明发展意味着什么。或许如今最让人害怕的情形就是，我们将面临一个从根本上转变，却饱含着不确定性的世界。